We study optimal stochastic control problems with jumps under model uncertainty. We rewrite such problems as stochastic differential games of forwardbackward stochastic differential equations. We prove general stochastic maximum principles for such games, both in the zero-sum case (finding conditions for saddle points) and for the nonzero sum games (finding conditions for Nash equilibria). We then apply these results to study robust optimal portfolio-consumption problems with penalty. We establish a connection between market viability under model uncertainty and equivalent martingale measures. In the case with entropic penalty, we prove a general reduction theorem, stating that a optimal portfolio-consumption problem under model uncertainty can be reduced to a classical portfolio-consumption problem under model certainty, with a change in the utility function, and we relate this to risk sensitive control. In particular, this result shows that model uncertainty increases the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion index.
the problem of model uncertainty. This paper is motivated by a topic of this type. We consider a stochastic system described by a general Itô-Lévy process controlled by an agent. The performance functional is expressed as the Q-expectation of an integrated profit rate plus a terminal payoff, where Q is a probability measure equivalent to the original probability measure P , which is often called a reference measure. We may regard Q as a scenario measure controlled by the market or the environment. If Q = P , the problem becomes a classical stochastic control problem of the type studied in [1] . If Q is uncertain, however, the agent might seek the strategy which maximizes the performance in the worst possible choice of Q. This leads to a stochastic differential game between the agent and the market. Our approach is the following: We write the performance functional as the value at time t = 0 of the solution of an associated controlled backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). Thus, we arrive at a (zero-sum) stochastic differential game of a system of forward-backward SDEs (FBSDEs) that we study by the maximum principle approach.
There are several papers of related content. Stochastic control of forwardbackward SDEs (FBSDEs) has been studied in [2, 3] , and in [4] a maximum principle for stochastic differential g-expectation games of SDEs is developed. The recent papers [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] also study optimal portfolio under model uncertainty by means of BSDEs. The approaches in the three latter papers are strongly linked to the exponential utility case. A key feature of the current paper is that it applies to general utility functions and also general dynamics for the state process.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we state general stochastic maximum principles for stochastic differential games with partial information, both in the zerosum case (finding conditions for saddle points) and for the nonzero sum games (finding conditions for Nash equilibria). The proofs are given in Appendix A. In Sect. 3, we consider stochastic control problems under model uncertainty, also called robust control problems. We formulate these problems as (zero-sum) stochastic differential games of forward-backward SDEs (FBSDEs), and we study them by the maximum principle approach of Sect. 2. In Sect. 4, we apply these techniques to study a robust optimal portfolio-consumption problem with penalty. We establish a connection between market viability under model uncertainty and equivalent martingale measures. Finally, we study the case with entropic penalty, and we prove a general reduction theorem, stating that any optimal portfolio-consumption problem under model uncertainty can be reduced to a classical portfolio-consumption problem under model certainty, with a change in the utility function. In particular, we obtain a connection to risk-sensitive control, and we show that model uncertainty increases the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion index.
Maximum Principles for Stochastic Differential Games of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations

The Case of General (Nonzero) Stochastic Differential Games
In this section, we formulate and prove a sufficient and necessary maximum principle for general stochastic differential games (not necessarily zero-sum games) of forward-backward SDEs. Let (Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P ) be a filtered probability space, where P is a reference probability measure. Consider a controlled forward SDE of the form
dX(t) = dX u (t) = b t, X(t), u(t), ω dt + σ t, X(t), u(t), ω dB(t)
+ R γ t, X t − , u(t), ζ, ω Ñ (dt, dζ ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
where B is a Brownian motion, andÑ(dt, dζ ) = N(dt, dζ ) − ν(dζ ) dt is an independent compensated Poisson random measure, where ν is the Lévy measure of N such that R ζ 2 ν(dζ ) < ∞. We assume that F = {F t , t ≥ 0} is the P -augmentation of the natural filtration associated with B and N . Here u = (u 1 , u 2 ), where u i (t) is the control of player i, i = 1, 2. We assume that we are given two subfiltrations
representing the information available to player i at time t; i = 1, 2. We let A i denote a given set of admissible control processes for player i, contained in the set of E
are given predictable processes for each x in R, u in U, and ζ in R 0 := R\{0} such that (1) has a unique solution for each u in U.
We consider the associated controlled backward SDEs (i.e., BSDEs) in the un-
Here g i (·, x, y, z, k, u, ω) are given predictable processes for each x in R, y in R, z in R, k in R R 0 , u in U, ζ , and h i (x, ω) is F T -measurable for each given x in R, such that the BSDEs (3) have unique solutions for each u in U.
Let
: R → R, and ψ i (x) : R → R be given profit rates, bequest functions, and "risk evaluations" respectively, of player i, i = 1, 2. Define
provided that the integrals and expectations exist. We call J i (u) the performance functional of player i, i = 1, 2. We assume that b, σ, γ , g i , h i , f i , ϕ i , and ψ i are C 1 with respect to x, y, z, u and that
A Nash equilibrium for the FBSDE game (1)-(4) is a pair (û 1 ,û 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 such that
and
Heuristically, this means that player i has no incentive to deviate from the controlû i , as long as player j (j = i) does not deviate fromû j , i = 1, 2. Therefore a Nash equilibrium is in some cases a likely outcome of a game. Suppose that there exists a Nash equilibrium (û 1 ,û 2 ). We now present a method to find it, based on the maximum principle for stochastic control. Our result may be regarded as an extension of the maximum principles for FBSDEs in [2] and for (forward) SDE games in [4] .
Define the Hamiltonians
where R is the set of functions from R 0 into R such that the integral in (8) converges. We assume that H i is Fréchet differentiable (C 1 ) in the variables x, y, z, k, u, i = 1, 2, and that ∇ k H i (t, ζ ) as a random measure is absolutely continuous with respect to ν, i = 1, 2. We also assume that H i and its derivatives with respect to u 1 and u 2 are integrable with respect to P , i = 1, 2.
In the following, we are using the shorthand notation
and similarly for the other partial derivatives of H i . To these Hamiltonians we associate a system of FBSDEs in the adjoint processes λ i (t), p i (t), q i (t), and r i (t, ζ ) as follows:
where
See Appendix A for an explanation of the gradient operator (3), (9), and (10) for i = 1, 2. Suppose that the following holds:
• (The conditional maximum principle) (11) and similarly
• (Concavity II) (The Arrow conditions) The functionŝ
are concave for all t, a.s.
• Moreover, assume that the following growth conditions hold:
Above and in the proof in Appendix A, we have used the following shorthand notation:
(t) are the processes corresponding to the control u(t) = (u 1 (t),û 2 (t)), whileX(t) = Xû(t) andŶ 1 (t) = Yû 1 (t) are those corresponding to the controlû(t) = (û 1 (t),û 2 (t)). An analogue notation is used for i = 2. Moreover, we put
and similarly with
Proof See Appendix A.
It is also of interest to prove a version of the maximum principle which does not require the concavity conditions. One such version is the following necessary maximum principle (Theorem 2.2) which requires the following assumptions:
• For all t 0 ∈ [0, T ] and all bounded, E (i) t -measurable random variables α i (ω), the control
• For all u i , β i ∈ A i with β i bounded, there exists δ i > 0 such that the control
• The following derivative processes exist and belong to L 2 ([0, T ] × Ω):
and, similarly,
Note that since X u (0) = x for all u, we have x i (0) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
In the following we write
By (1) and (3) we have, using the estimates in [4] ,
and similarly for dx 2 (t), dy 2 (t).
We are now ready to state a necessary maximum principle, which is an extension of Theorem 3.1 in [4] and Theorem 3.1 in [2] . In the sequel,
Theorem 2.2 (Necessary maximum principle) Suppose that u ∈ A with corresponding solutions X(t), Y i (t), Z i (t), K i (t, ζ ), λ i (t), p i (t), q i (t), r i (t, ζ ) of Eqs.
(1), (3), (9) and (10) . Suppose that (14) , (15) , and (16) hold.
Moreover, assume that
Then the following are equivalent:
The Zero-Sum Game Case
In the zero-sum case we have
From this we deduce that
Since we always have inf sup ≥ sup inf, we conclude that
i.e., (
In this case, only one Hamiltonian is needed, and only one set of adjoint equations.
It follows that
The adjoint processes for p i , q i , and r i , i = 1, 2, become by (10)
and, by (10) and (26),
Thus, we see that
Consequently,
We thus conclude that in the zero-sum game case, we only need one Hamiltonian and one quadruple of controlled adjoint processes. In the following, we set: (23), and
We can now state the necessary and sufficient maximum principles for the zerosum game: Theorem 2.3 (Necessary maximum principle for zero-sum forward-backward games) Assume that the conditions of Theorem 2.2 hold. Then the following are equivalent:
Proof The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.2 and is omitted. Similarly, we get Theorem 2.4 (Sufficient maximum principle for zero-sum forward-backward games)
with corresponding solutionsX(t),Ŷ (t),Ẑ(t),K(t),λ(t), p(t),q(t),r(t, ζ ). Suppose that the following hold:
• The functions x → ϕ(x) and x → ψ(x) are affine, and the function x → h(x) is concave.
• (The conditional maximum principle)
λ(t),p(t),q(t),r(t, ·) | E (2) t = E H t,X(t),Ŷ (t),Ẑ(t),K(t, ·),
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is concave, and the function
• The growth condition (13) holds withp i =p, etc.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.1 and is omitted.
Stochastic Control under Model Uncertainty
Let X(t) = X v x (t) be a controlled Itô-Lévy process of the form
dX(t) = b t, X(t), v(t), ω dt + σ t, X(t), v(t), ω dB(t)
where v(·) is the control process, and b, σ , and γ are as in Sect. 2.1. We consider a model uncertainty setup, represented by a probability measure Q = Q θ which is equivalent to P , with the Radon-Nikodym derivative on F t given by
where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , G θ (t) is a martingale of the form
Here θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 ) may be regarded as a scenario control. Let A 1 denote a given family of admissible controls v, and A 2 denote a given set of admissible scenario controls
0≤t≤T and E (2) 0≤t≤T be given subfiltrations of F 0≤t≤T , representing the information available to the controllers at time t. It is required that v ∈ A 1 be E 1 t -predictable, and θ ∈ A 2 be E 2 t -predictable. We set u = (v, θ ). We consider the stochastic differential game to find
where U and F are given functions. For example, U is a given utility function, and
can then be seen as a penalty term, penalizing the difference between Q θ and the original probability measure P .
We have
We now define
(41) Then we recognize Y (t) as the solution of the linear BSDE (see Lemma B.1)
Y (T ) = U X v (T ) .
Note that
Therefore, problem (38) can be written as
where Proceeding as in Sect. 2, define the Hamiltonian
Define a pair of FBSDEs in the adjoint processes λ(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ ) as follows. Forward SDE for λ(t):
Backward SDE for (p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ )):
Here we have used the abbreviated notation
X(t), Y (t), Z(t), K(t, ·), v(t), θ (t), λ(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ·)
and similarly for the other partial derivatives. We now present a necessary maximum principle for the forward-backward stochastic differential game (35), (42), (44) by adapting Theorem 2.3 to this case. 
Note that both ∇ θ 1 F and R (·)K(t, ζ )ν(dζ ) are linear functionals, the latter being defined by the action
for all bounded continuous functions ϕ : R 0 → R.
Robust Optimal Portfolio and Consumption with Penalty
We now apply this to the following portfolio problem under model uncertainty. We restrict here ourselves to the case E
Consider a financial market consisting of a bond with unit price S 0 (t)=1, 0≤t ≤T , and a stock, with unit price S(t) given by
, and γ 0 (t, ζ ) = γ 0 (t, ζ, ω) are given {F t }-predictable processes such that γ 0 ≥ −1 + for some > 0, and
Note that this system is non-Markovian since the coefficients are random processes. Let X(t) = X π,c (t) be the wealth process corresponding to a portfolio π(t) and a consumption rate c(t), i.e.,
(49) For π and c to be admissible, we require that X π,c ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We consider the stochastic differential game to find (π,ĉ,θ)
where U and U 1 are utility functions, and ρ is a convex function. We have seen in Sect. 3 that this problem can be written as
Y (T ) = U X(T ) .
In particular,
The Hamiltonian for the problem (52) is, by (45),
H (t, x, y, z, k, π, c, θ, λ, p, q, r)
The forward SDE for λ(t) = λ θ (t) is
By comparing (37) and (57), we see that
The BSDE for (p π,c,θ (t), q π,c,θ (t), r π,c,θ (t, ζ )) = (p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ )) is (see (46)-(47))
dp(t) = q(t) dB(t) + R r(t, ζ )Ñ(dt, dζ ), t ∈ [0, T ], p(T ) = λ(T )U X(T ) = G θ (T )U X(T ) .
(59)
We get
Viability and Martingale Measures
We now apply the necessary maximum principle given by Theorem 3.1. Maximizing H with respect to π and c and minimizing H with respect to θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 ) gives the following first-order conditions for the optimal portfolio π , the optimal consumption rate c, and the optimal scenario parameter θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 ):
Equation (61) can be written as
By the Girsanov theorem (see, e.g., [1] , Chap. 1), this means that the measureQ on F T , defined by
with
is an equivalent local martingale measure (ELMM) for the market price process S(t) given by (48). By (59) and (67) we get
R t − dp(t) = R t − q(t) dB(t) + R r(t, ζ )Ñ(dt, dζ )
i.e.,
dp(t) p(t − ) = dR(t) R(t − ) .
We conclude that
Therefore,
dQ(ω) = G θ (T )U (X π,c (T )) E[G θ (T )U (X π,c (T ))
This proves the first part of the following result:
Theorem 4.1 (a) Suppose that there exists an optimal portfolio π , an optimal consumption rate c, and an optimal scenario parameter θ for the model uncertainty portfolio-consumption optimization problem (52). Then (62) holds, and the measurẽ Q = Q π,c,θ defined by (68) is an ELMM for the market (48). (b) Conversely, suppose that there exists a portfolio π , a consumption rate c, and a scenario parameter θ such that (62) holds andQ = Q π,c,θ defined by (68) is an ELMM for the market (48). Suppose that there exists a unique solution Y (t) of the BSDE (54), with θ satisfying (63)-(64).
Defineθ
as the solution of the equation
Suppose that the function
is concave. Then π is an optimal portfolio, c is an optimal consumption rate, and θ is an optimal scenario parameter for the problem (52).
Proof of (b)
IfQ is defined by (68), then, by (59),
where dp(t) = p t
It follows by the Girsanov theorem that ifQ is an ELMM for S(t),we must have 
(T )U (X π,c (T )) E[G θ (T )U (X π,c (T ))] dP
is an ELMM. This is an extension to model uncertainty markets of the following result which is well known in classical types of financial markets, mainly the equivalence between (i) the existence of an optimal portfolio (viability) and (ii) the measure dQ :
= U (X(T ))/E[U (X(T ))
] dP being an ELMM. See, e.g., [10] [11] [12] [13] .
Remark 4.2 Using the same method, we can also consider performances of the form (39) with U(X π,c (T )) replaced by
T 0 U(X π,c (t)) dt.
The Entropic Penalty Case
We consider now the case where the penalty function has the form
where a > 0 is a given parameter, and
Note that, by (37),
Therefore, the relative entropy E(Q θ | P ) of Q θ with respect to P defined as
is seen to be
We call ρ a the entropic penalty function. Then, the optimality conditions (63) and (64) for θ 0 , θ 1 become
Substituted into (54), this gives
It follows that (78) can be written as
Taking exponentials gives
In particular, if we put t = T , we get
This gives the optimal scenario G θ (T ) expressed in terms of the optimal terminal wealth X(T ) = X π,c (T ) and the optimal consumption rate c. Combining this with Theorem 4.1a), we get that
(s)) ds)U (X(T )) E[exp(−aU (X(T ))
is an ELMM. With our choice of ρ, we see that the concavity condition for the function H defined in (70) is satisfied. Therefore, if we combine Theorem 4.1 with the calculations above, we get the following: 
An equivalent formulation involving only π and c is as follows: 
Proof ( 
and let θ 0 , θ 1 be such that
is the Itô representation of the martingale G(t). Then, with G θ (t) = G(t) we see that (π, c, θ) satisfies all the requirements in part (b) of Theorem 4.2, and hence (π, c, θ) is optimal.
We now compare this result to a model certainty problem, as follows. Let X(t) be as in (49) and choose a utility function V . With U 1 , U as above, define the performance functional
We want to find (π,ĉ) ∈ A 1 such that
To put this problem into the context of our maximum principle, we define X 2 (t) = X(t) and
Then
and the corresponding Hamiltonian becomes
The adjoint equations are
Arguing as before, we now deduce that (π, c) is optimal for (87) if and only if
and the measure
is an ELMM for the market (48). Therefore, if we choose
and compare (92) and (93) with (83) and (80), respectively, we obtain the following:
Theorem 4.4 (Model uncertainty reduction theorem) Suppose that (π, c) ∈ A is optimal for the (model certainty) portfolio-consumption problem
Then (π, c) is optimal for the model uncertainty portfolio-consumption problem
where E(Q θ | P ) is the relative entropy of Q θ with respect to P . Moreover, the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the optimal probability measure Q θ is given by
Remark 4.3 When the optimal G θ (T ) is known, we can find the corresponding θ 0 (t) and θ 1 (t, ζ ) in feedback form as follows: By the Clark-Ocone theorem combined with (37), we get
where D t and D t,ζ denote the Malliavin derivatives with respect to B(·) and N(·, ·), respectively (see [14] ). We refer to [15] for more information on Malliavin calculus for Lévy processes.
Theorem 4.4 shows that the problem of optimal portfolio and consumption under model uncertainty with entropic penalty can be reduced to a corresponding model certainty problem, but with a different performance functional (different utilities).
Model Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion at x of a utility function U is defined by
Hence,
We conclude that the risk aversion of W is bigger that the risk aversion of U . Hence, in view of Theorem 4.4, we can say that, in this sense, model uncertainty increases the risk aversion. For more discussion on this topic, see [16] and the references therein.
Relation of Robust Portfolio-Consumption Problem with Entropic Penalty with Risk-Sensitive Control
Fix π , c and let X(T ) and c(t) ) dt be the corresponding terminal wealth and total utility from consumption, respectively.
Consider the problem
where ρ a is the entropic penalty defined in (73), so that
We have seen that (99) can be written as
where Y θ (t) solves the BSDE
By the comparison theorem for BSDEs (see [17] and [18] ) , we see that to solve (101), all we need is to minimize
The first-order conditions for optimalθ are
Substituting this into (103) and arguing as before, we obtain the formula (79), i.e.,
Therefore, sinceθ is optimal, we get
We conclude that our robust portfolio-consumption problem (101) with entropic penalty is related to risk-sensitive control as follows:
This is an extension to consumption-portfolio settings of the risk-sensitive control result in [19] . See also the references therein. (107) shows in particular that the sup-inf part of the model uncertainty problem (50) can be reduced to an optimal consumption-portfolio problem with model certainty. Note that the proof of this is relatively easy and does not require the whole machinery that we have set up in the previous sections. However, it seems that the inf-sup part of the same problem cannot be proved so easily; this part requires techniques for optimal control of forward-backward SDE control/games, as developed in this paper.
Remark 4.4 Equation
Concluding Remarks
This paper has two main parts:
• The first is a general maximum principle for forward-backward stochastic differential games for Itô-Lévy processes with partial information. This is a result of independent interest, and it has a potential for being useful in many situations.
• The second is an application of the general theory in the first part to optimal portfolio and consumption problems under model uncertainty, in markets modeled by Itô-Lévy processes. The model uncertainty is represented by a family of equivalent probability measures, with a penalty for being "far away" from the original measure P . We obtain a characterization of market viability under model uncertainty in terms of equivalent local martingale measures. If the penalty function is entropic, we prove a reduction theorem saying that the model uncertainty problem can be transformed into a problem without model uncertainty, but with different utility functions.
It is natural to ask if similar results could be obtained with other representations of model uncertainty. For example, one could consider uncertainties in the noise terms or put constraints on the families of probability measures. In particular, can our reduction theorem for the entropic penalty be extended to more general model uncertainty contexts?
exists. (ii) We say that F is Fréchet differentiable at x ∈ V if there exists a linear map
In this case, we call L the gradient (or Fréchet derivative) of F at x, and we write
(iii) If F is Fréchet differentiable, then F has a directional derivative in all directions y ∈ X , and
Proof of Theorem 2.1 (Sufficient maximum principle) We first prove that
To this end, fix u 1 ∈ A 1 and consider
By (8) we have
By the concavity of ϕ 1 , (10), and the Itô formula,
By the concavity of ψ 1 , (5), (9) , and the concavity of ϕ ,
Adding (A.5), (A.6), and (A.7), we get
SinceĤ 1 (x, y, z, k) is concave, it follows by a standard separating hyperplane argument (see, e.g., [20] , Chap. 5, Sect. 23) that there exists a supergradient a = (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 
On the other hand, we clearly have
It follows that Hence,
Υ (t, s) = Υ (0, s) Υ (0, t) .
Proof For completeness, we give the proof, also given in [18] . The existence and uniqueness follow by general theorems for BSDEs with Lipschitz coefficients. See, e.g., [17] . Hence, it only remains to prove that if we define Y (t) to be the solution of (B.1), then (B.2) holds. To this end, define
Υ (s) = Υ (0, s).
Then by the Itô formula (see, e.g., [1] , Chap. 1), 
d Υ (t)Y (t) = Υ t − dY (t) + Y t − dΥ (t) + d[Υ Y ](t) = Υ t − − ϕ(t) + β(t)Y (t) + ξ 0 (t)Z(t) +
= −Υ (t)ϕ(t) dt + Z(t) + ξ 0 (t)Y (t) Υ (t) dB(t)
+ R ξ 1 (t, ζ )Υ t − Y t − + K(t, ζ ) Ñ (dt, dζ ).
